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129 S. Ct. 2145 
Decided June 2009
Question Presented:
Whether the holding of a state post-conviction
hearing to determine the mental capacity of a capital de-
fendant whose death sentence was affirmed before
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 u.S. 304 (2002), which barred
the execution of mentally retarded defendants, violates
the Double Jeopardy clause.
Facts:
In 1992, Michael Bies was convicted of aggra-
vated murder, kidnapping, and attempted rape of a ten
year-old boy.  During sentencing, the trial court consid-
ered Bies’s mild to borderline mental retardation as a
mitigating circumstance, but ultimately concluded that
aggravating factors warranted the death penalty.  The
state appeal and supreme courts affirmed the conviction
and sentence.
In 2002, the u.S. Supreme Court ruled in Atkins
v. Virginia, 536 u.S. 304 (2002) that execution of men-
tally retarded individuals violates the eighth Amend-
ment.  In light of the Atkins decision, Bies filed petition
for post-conviction relief, but argued that the state could
not re-litigate his mental capacity because it had already
been determined in the original trial.  
The state court determined that it was not barred
from evaluating Bies’s mental capacity because the stan-
dard for mental retardation had been altered by Atkins.
Bies then filed for habeus corpus relief in federal district
court.  The district court granted Bies’s petition and or-
dered that his death sentence be vacated.  The Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, finding
that the state supreme court had previously concluded
Bies’s mental retardation under a standard that entitled
Bies to a life sentence.  
Decision:
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the 
Sixth Circuit’s decision, holding that Bies was not pro
tected by the double jeopardy clause, because he was 
not twice put in jeopardy, and that “the touchstone for
double-jeopardy protection in capital-sentencing pro-
ceedings is whether there had been an ‘acquittal.’”  The
Court explained that no state court finding gave Bies the
right to a life sentence because issue preclusion only oc-
curs when “a determination ranks as necessary or essen-
tial only when the final outcome hinges on it.” After
considering the weight given to Bies’s mental status in
the state courts, the Court found that “Bies’s mental ca-
pacity was not necessary to the judgments affirming his
death sentence.”
129 S. Ct. 1849 
Decided April 2009
Question Presented:
Whether 18 u.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii), estab-
lishing a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence for a
defendant who “discharge[s]” a firearm during a crime
of violence, requires proof that the discharge was voli-
tional, and not merely accidental, unintentional, or in-
voluntary.
Facts:
Christopher Michael Dean, while robbing a bank
and obtaining money from the teller’s drawer, acciden-
tally discharged his gun, hitting a partition between two
teller stations.  Dean was arrested, along with Ricardo
Curtis Lopez, for conspiracy to commit a robbery under
18 u.S.C. § 1951(a), and aiding and abetting each other
“in using, carrying, possessing, and discharging a
firearm during an armed robbery” under 18 u.S.C §
924(c)(1)(A)(iii).  The district court convicted Dean of
both counts and sentenced him to ten years in prison,
pursuant to § 924(c)(1)(A)(iii) sentencing guidelines,
because the firearm discharged during the course of the
robbery.  On appeal, Dean argued that the discharge of
the gun was accidental and § 924 required proof of in-
tent to discharge the firearm.  The court of appeals af-
firmed the district court’s decision.   
Decision:
Dean v. United States
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The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s
ruling and held that the language and structure of §
924(c)(1)(A)(iii) did not require the prosecution to prove
the defendant intended to discharge a firearm.  namely,
the language in the statute did not specify that the dis-
charge of the gun must be performed knowingly or in-
tentionally.
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the struc-
ture of the statute and the common law presumption that
criminal penalties require proof of mens rea supported
a holding that the provision regarding firearm discharge
only applies to intentional discharges. Justice Breyer
also dissented, finding that the statute was meant to
apply only to intentional discharges of firearms.  he
based his analysis on the rule of lenity, finding the dis-
charge provision “sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the
application of that rule.”
129 S. Ct. 1079 
Decided February 2009
Question Presented:
Whether, to qualify as a “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” under 18 u.S.C. § 921(a)(33)(A), an
offense must have as an element a domestic relationship
between the offender and the victim.
Facts:
While responding to a domestic violence report,
police officers appeared at the residence of Randy ed-
ward hayes and found several firearms in his posses-
sion.  hayes, who had been previously convicted of
battery, was arrested and charged under 18 u.S.C. §
921(a)(33)(A), which prohibits the possession of
firearms by individuals who have been convicted of a
“misdemeanor crime of domestic violence.”  hayes filed
a motion to dismiss, arguing that his previous battery
conviction, the predicate offense, did not have, as an el-
ement, a “domestic relationship” between the victim and
offender.  The district court denied the motion and
hayes pleaded guilty. The Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that a predicate offense under §
922(g)(9) must include an element of a domestic rela-
tionship.  
Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
Fourth Circuit decision, finding, “it suffices for the Gov-
ernment to charge and prove a prior conviction that was,
in fact, for ‘an offense…committed by’ the defendant
against a spouse or other domestic victim.”  The Court
first noted that Congress used the word “element” sin-
gularly, implying that it only intended one required ele-
ment to satisfy § 921(a)(33)(A).  The Court reasoned
that if Congress meant to make (1) the use of force and
(2) the relationship between aggressor and victim an el-
ement of the predicate offense, “it likely would have
used the plural ‘elements’ as it has done in other offense-
defining provisions.”  In addition, the Court relied on
the purpose of the statute, which was enacted to extend
punishment to domestic abusers who failed to receive
punishment for the possession of firearms under then
existing felon-in-possession laws.  The Court reasoned
that, “to exclude the domestic abuser convicted under a
generic use-of-force statute (one that does not designate
a domestic relationship as an element of the offense)
would frustrate Congress’s manifest purpose.”
Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Scalia, dis-
sented, claiming that the text of the statute was ambigu-
ous, but, “the fact that Congress included the domestic
relationship language in the clause of the statute desig-
nating the element of the predicate offense strongly sug-
gests that it is in fact part of the required element.” 
129 S. Ct 1841 
Decided April 2009
Question Presented:
Whether prosecutors may use a defendant’s
statement, made in the absence of a knowing and vol-
untary waiver of the right to counsel, to impeach a wit-
ness, as opposed to during its case-in-chief.
Facts:
Donnie Ray Ventris and Rhonda Theel con-
fronted ernest hicks in his home, and during the con-
frontation hicks was shot and killed.  Ventris and Theel
and drove away in hicks’ truck, taking his money and
cell phone.  Both Ventris and Theel were arrested and
charged with robbery and hicks’s murder.  Theel struck
a bargain with the state to drop the murder charge in ex-
change for Theel pleading guilty to robbery and testify-
ing that Ventris was the shooter.  Meanwhile, an
informant planted in Ventris’s jail cell claimed that he
heard Ventris admit to shooting hicks and stealing his
keys, wallet, money, and car.  At trial, Ventris testified
Hayes v. United States
Kansas v. Ventris
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that Theel was responsible for the robbery and shooting.
The state could not introduce Ventris’s confession to the
informant in its case-in-chief because it violated the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, but sought to intro-
duce the informant’s testimony to impeach Ventris’s tes-
timony.  The trial court allowed the testimony, but
instructed the jury to consider it with caution.  The jury
acquitted Ventris of felony murder and misdemeanor
theft, but convicted him for aggravated burglary and ag-
gravated robbery.  The Kansas Supreme Court reversed
the conviction, holding that the statements made to the
informant were not admissible at trial for any reason, in-
cluding impeachment.      
Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the Kansas
Supreme Court decision and held that the informant’s
testimony regarding Ventris’s confession was admissible
to impeach Ventris’s testimony.
expanding on the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel as defined in Massiah v. United States, 377 u.S.
201 (1964), the Court clarified that a defendant’s right
to counsel is “a right to be free of uncounseled interro-
gation, and is infringed at the time of the interrogation.”
The Court noted, “We have held in every other context
that tainted evidence – evidence whose very introduc-
tion does not constitute the constitutional violation, but
whose obtaining was constitutionally invalid – is admis-
sible for impeachment.” 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dis-
sented, stating that the Court’s holding “eroded the prin-
ciple that ‘those who are entrusted with the power of
government have the same duty to respect and obey the
law as the ordinary citizen.’” (Citation omitted).
129 S. Ct. 2527  
Decided June 2009
Question Presented: 
Whether a state forensic analyst’s laboratory re-
port prepared for use in a criminal prosecution is “testi-
monial” evidence subject to the demands of the
Confrontation Clause as set forth in Crawford v. Wash-
ington, 541 u.S. 36 (2004). 
Facts:
Police officers arrested Luis Melendez-Diaz,
along with two other suspects, after finding four bags of
a substance suspected to be cocaine in a vehicle occu-
pied by the three suspects.  When the officers delivered
the men to the police station, they found an additional
bag of suspected cocaine hidden between the seats of
their police cruiser.  The officers submitted the bag to a
state forensics laboratory.  Forensic technicians identi-
fied the substance as cocaine.  Subsequently, Melendez-
Diaz was charged with distributing and trafficking
cocaine.  At trial, the forensic technicians provided af-
fidavits that were admitted into evidence.  The jury con-
victed Melendez-Diaz and the Appeals Court of
Massachusetts affirmed the conviction. 
Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
lower court’s decision, holding that the forensic techni-
cians’ affidavits constituted testimonial statements,
which entitled Melendez-Diaz to confrontation rights
under the Sixth Amendment as defined in Crawford v.
Washington, 541 u.S. 36 (2004).  In Crawford, the
Court held that the Confrontation Clause “guarantees a
defendant’s right to confront those who bear testimony
against him,” and “a witness’s testimony against a de-
fendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears
at trial, or if the witness is unavailable, the defendant
had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.”  The
Court refused to view the affidavits as comparable to
business records, which do not implicate a right of con-
frontation, because the business records are “created for
the administration of an entity’s affairs and not for the
purpose of establishing or proving some fact at trial –
they are not testimonial.  The Court further reasoned that
“exercising the right to confront a forensic analyst
would be invaluable to a petitioner because an analyst’s
lack of proper training or deficiency in judgment may
be disclosed in cross-examination.”
Justice Thomas concurred and emphasized that
the documents at issue were clearly affidavits, thus they
constituted testimonial statements and were subject to
the Confrontation Clause. 
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Breyer and
Alito, dissented, claiming that, “[t]he Court sweeps
away an accepted rule governing the admission of sci-
entific evidence.”  The dissent predicted that the Court’s
ruling “has vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures
that already give ample protections against the misuse
of scientific evidence.”
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
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129 S. Ct. 1423
Decided March 2009
Question Presented:
Whether forfeited claims that the government
breached a plea agreement are subject to “plain error”
review.
Facts:
James Puckett was indicted on two charges:
armed bank robbery and using a firearm during and in
relation to a crime of violence.  Puckett negotiated a plea
agreement that, in exchange for pleading guilty on both
counts, waiving his trial rights, and cooperating with the
Government’s investigation, the Government would
stipulate that Puckett demonstrated acceptance of re-
sponsibility, thereby qualifying him a reduction in his
offense level and guidance level.  Before sentencing,
Puckett confessed to his probation officer that he had
engaged in a ploy to defraud the government.  There-
after, the probation officer recommended that Puckett
receive no reduction for acceptance of responsibility.
During sentencing, Puckett’s counsel protested to the
recommendation, but the district judge refused to grant
the reduction. Puckett did not object that the Govern-
ment violated its obligations pursuant to the plea agree-
ment.  On appeal to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
Puckett argued the Government violated the plea agree-
ment.  The Government argued that Puckett forfeited his
claim because he failed to raise the objection at trial.
The court of appeals, applying the plain-error standard,
found that an obvious error occurred, but that Puckett
failed to demonstrate that the error caused him prejuice
by affecting his substantial rights.
Decision:
The Supreme Court affirmed Puckett’s sentence
and held that the plain error test applies in the usual
fashion to a forfeited claim that the government failed to
meet its obligations under a plea agreement.  In so hold-
ing, the Court analogized a plea bargain to a contract,
stating “[w]hen the consideration for a contract fails –
that is when one of the exchanged promises is not kept
– we do not say that the voluntary bilateral consent to
the contract never existed, so that it is automatically and
utterly void; we say that the contract was broken.”  With
this analogy, the Court reasoned, “rescission is not the
only possible remedy,” and therefore in the case of a
breached plea agreement, the guilty plea is also not au-
tomatically void.  The Court also noted that “[t]he de-
fendant whose plea agreement has been broken by the
Government will not always be able to show prejudice,
either because he obtained the benefits contemplated by
the deal anyway or because he likely would not have
obtained those benefits in any event.” 
Justice Souter, joined by Justice Stevens, dis-
sented, finding that the Government’s breach of the plea
agreement affected Puckett’s substantial rights.  “under
the Constitution the protected liberty interest in freedom
from criminal taint, subject to the Fifth Amendment’s
due process guarantee of fundamental fairness, is prop-
erly understood to require a trial or plea agreement hon-
ored by the Government before the stigma of a
conviction can be imposed.”
129 S. Ct. 2633
Decided June 2009
Question Presented:   
Whether the Fourth Amendment prohibits public
school officials from conducting a strip search of a stu-
dent suspected of possessing and distributing a prescrip-
tion drug on campus in violation of school policy. 
Facts: 
Middle school officials subjected thirteen year-
old Savanna Redding to a strip search after receiving a
report that Redding was distributing prescription Ibupro-
fen to other students.  After the school officials searched
Redding’s backpack, they directed her to the nurse’s of-
fice, where the school nurse ordered Redding to remove
her outer clothes and then shake out her underwear and
bra.  The search did not uncover any contraband.  Red-
ding’s mother filed suit against the school district and
school officials for violating Redding’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights.  The district court granted summary judg-
ment in the school’s favor on the basis that school
officials were protected by qualified immunity.  how-
ever, the ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, reversed in part,
finding that the school official that authorized the search
could be held liable for an unconstitutional search be-
cause he made the decision to perform the strip search.   
Decision: 
The Supreme Court held that the strip search vi-
Stafford Unified School District v. Redding
Puckett v. United States
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olated the Fourth Amendment, but that, due to the lack
of clarity with regard to school searches of students, all
officials who ordered and witnessed the search were
protected by qualified immunity.   
In reaching its decision, the Court applied the
test for student searches by school officials established
in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 u.S. 325 (1984), which
states that a school search “will be permissible in its
scope when the measures adopted are reasonably related
to the objectives of the search and not excessively in-
trusive in light of the age and sex of the student and the
nature of the infraction.”  The Court found that under
this standard, it was reasonable to search Redding’s
backpack and outer clothes because the school officials
suspected that she was in possession of a banned sub-
stance.  however, the Court found it unreasonable to
search her underwear because school officials lacked
any indication that the power or degree of the drugs
posed a danger to students and had no reason to believe
that Redding was carrying drugs in her underwear.  The
question of the school district’s liability, which was not
resolved, was remanded for consideration.     
Justice Stevens concurred in part and dissented
in part, agreeing with the Court’s holding that the strip
search was unconstitutional, but disagreeing with the de-
cision to extend qualified immunity to the school offi-
cials who authorized the search.  Justice Ginsburg also
concurred in part and dissented in part, agreeing that the
search violated the Fourth Amendment, but finding that
the T.L.O. test clearly established the law governing stu-
dent searches by school officials and, therefore, quali-
fied immunity should not have been extended to the
school officials.   
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment in
part and dissented in part, agreeing with the Court’s ex-
tension of qualified immunity to the school officials, but
believed that the search of the student did not violate the
Fourth Amendment under the T.L.O. standard and that
the Court’s decision improperly undermined school of-
ficials’ authority. 
129 S. Ct 823 
Decided January 2009
Question Presented:  
Whether federal courts must accept state courts’
determinations that jury instructions fully and correctly
set out state law governing accomplice liablity when re-
viewing a due process challenge under 28 u.S.C. §
2254?
Facts:
Cesar Sarausad II was a member of a gang
known as the 23rd Street Diablos.  Sarausad was driving
a car when a passenger and fellow gang member leaned
out the window and began shooting at members of a
rival gang, the Bad Side Posse.  The shots killed and in-
jured several people.  Sarausad was tried as an accom-
plice to second-degree murder, attempted second-degree
murder, and second-degree assault.  Sarausad argued
that he had no knowledge of the intent to commit mur-
der, only the assault.  During closing arguments, the
state prosecutor used the phrase “in for a dime, in for a
dollar” to summarize the elements of accomplice liabil-
ity.  The trial judge instructed the jury that one’s knowl-
edge that a crime will occur is sufficient to establish the
person as an accomplice; it is not necessary for an ac-
complice to have specific intent to aide in the commis-
sion of the crime.  The jury convicted Sarasusad and he
was sentenced to twenty-seven years in prison.  The
Washington Supreme Court upheld the conviction.
however, the Washington Supreme Court later held in
State v. Roberts, 142 Wn. 2d 471 (2000), that the ex-
pression “in for a dime, in for a dollar” was inaccurate
to describe accomplice liability because the phrase im-
plies that an accomplice who knows of one crime could
also be liable for a far greater crime.  
Following the Roberts decision, Sarausad re-
quested post-conviction relief, but the Washington
Supreme Court ultimately denied his petition, finding
that the jury instructions were sufficient and that the
prosecutor’s comment was not prejudicial.  Then Sarau-
sad filed and was granted a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in federal district court.  The district court found
that there was sufficient evidence that the jury was con-
fused about the elements of accomplice liability.  The
Court of Appeals for the ninth Circuit affirmed.    
Decision:
The Supreme Court reversed the ninth Circuit
decision, holding that the jury instructions properly fol-
lowed Washington’s statute regarding accomplice lia-
bility.  The Court found error in the ninth Circuit’s
ruling because it “evaluated whether respondent’s con-
viction required a specific intent versus a general intent
to kill, not whether it required knowledge of a murder
versus knowledge of an assault – the issue under review
here.  Additionally, the Court found that there was no
Waddington v. Sarausad
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evidence that the prosecutor’s comment, “in for dime,
in for a dollar,” led to juror confusion regarding the el-
ements of accomplice liability.  
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and
Ginsburg, dissented, rejecting that the majority’s posi-
tion that the jury instructions were clear because they
incorporated language of the statute.  According to
Souter, the statute itself was not clear in light of the
Washington State Supreme Court ruling in Roberts.  The
dissent also asserted that the prosecutor’s ambiguous
statement was enough to confuse a jury.   
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